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FROM JUSTICE TO GLOBAL PEACE:
A (BRIEF) GENEALOGY OF THE CLASS
ACTION CRISIS
Anne Bloom*
"The apple doesn't fall far from the tree ...
I. INTRODUCTION
Not that long ago, class actions were hailed as a "powerful and
versatile tool" for expanding access to justice, especially in the areas
of consumer and civil rights.2  The class action device was
"versatile" in expanding access because, through the aggregation of
individual claims, it became economically efficient to bring litigation
that would have been too expensive for individuals to pursue on their
own. And class actions were "powerful" because of the impact that
aggregating claims had on defendants.3
Today, however, the conventional wisdom is that there is a class
action "crisis."4 A fair amount of the critique has been heaped on the
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of the Pacific McGeorge School of
Law; B.A., 1983, Mount Saint Mary's College; J.D., 1988, University of
Maryland; Ph.D., 2003, University of Washington.
1. Ancient proverb.
2. Darren Carter, Notice and the Protection of Class Members' Interests,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1121 (1996).
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Center for Individual Freedom, State Class Action Crisis
Continues with Microsoft, http:/www.cfif.org/htdocs/legalissues/archive/
legal-updates-microsoft.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2005); see also DEBORAH
R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 49-51 (2000); Helen Dewar, Senate Republicans Seek to Limit
Class-Action Suits, WASH. POST, July 6, 2004, at A2 (quoting Senator Charles
E. Grassley, "The reality is that the class action system is broken and we
should do something about it."); Steven B. Hantler & Robert E. Norton,
Coupon Settlements: The Emperor's Clothes of Class Actions, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1343 (2005); Charles W. Wolfram, Mass Torts-Messy Ethics,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1228 (1995).
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plaintiffs' lawyers who bring class action lawsuits,5 but plenty of
blame has been laid on the courts as well.6 At the heart of the
perceived "crisis" is a sense that class action litigation enriches
lawyers without providing any real benefit to society.7  Perhaps
because of this perception, there have been policy prescriptives for
the "crisis." These include proposals to place caps on the fees
awarded to plaintiffs class counsel, and to limit class actions to
cases in which a judge determines that the overall benefit of the
litigation to the class outweighs the cost of the litigation.
8
The aim of this Article is not to debate the merits of the recent
class action legislation, nor to argue for or against the various other
proposals that are now pending. Instead, I intend to explore a
different question-how a procedural device that, at one time, was
praised widely for its efficiency in increasing access to justice for
those whose claims would otherwise go unheard has more recently
become the focal point of an apparent legal "crisis."
5. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Class Actions and the Democratic
Difficulty: Rethinking the Intersection of Private Litigation and Public Goals,
2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 71, 77 (2003); Wolfram, supra note 4, at 1231.
6. See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119
Stat. 4 (responding to concerns about class actions in state courts by moving
many state court class actions into federal court). For a summary of the new
law, see Anthony Rollo & Gabriel A. Crowson, Mapping the New Class Action
Frontier-A Primer on the Class Action Fairness Act and Amended Federal
Rule 23, 59 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 11 (2005).
7. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation:
Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877 (1987); Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and
"Blackmail" Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1377 (2000).
8. In 1996, for example, a group of business leaders proposed changes to
the Federal Rules Committee that would have allowed a judge to refuse to
certify a class action if the judge determined that the probable relief to
individual class members did not justify the costs and burdens of class
litigation. See, e.g., H. Thomas Wells, Jr., Fine-Tuning Class Action Roles:
The Anatomy of a Change in Procedure, Bus. L. TODAY, May-June 1998, at
40; Letter from Paul V. Niemeyer, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to
Honorable Alicemarie H. Stotler, Chair, Standing Committee on Civil Rules of
Prac. & Proc. (Dec. 8, 1997) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review); see also TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 26.003(b) (Vernon 2005)
(requiring attorneys in so-called "coupon" settlements to be paid in the same
form as their clients).
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How did we get from there to here? And why has this
transformation proved to be so unsatisfactory? I will argue that to
understand the roots of today's "crisis" in class action law, we must
explore its genealogy. Put differently, we must trace the transition of
the class action device from its heyday in the late 1960s and 1970s,
when it was used primarily for the resolution of civil rights and other
small consumer claims, to its current incarnation as a vehicle for a
wide variety of mass settlements, including, most problematically,
personal injury claims.
A genealogy, rather than a simple history, is useful for
understanding the "crisis" because, in contrast to a more
conventional historical analysis, genealogy emphasizes transition and
the points at which key transitions occur.9 Indeed, genealogies are
particularly useful for understanding transformations in cultural
narratives and for tracking changes in the relationships of power that
both emanate from, and give rise to, new cultural understandings.
10
A complete genealogy of the class action "crisis" would, of course,
take up several volumes. While a worthwhile endeavor, the focus
here will be on the Agent Orange litigation, a series of cases viewed
by many as a turning point in class action law."l
In 1984, Judge Jack Weinstein made class action history when
he used class action law to resolve the personal injury claims of tens
of thousands of veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange during
their service in Vietnam. l2 Under the terms of the settlement, all
veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange, including so-called
"future" victims who did not yet know that they were injured, were
included in a class-wide resolution of the case. 17 The result was that
9. See Genealogy, in THE COLUMBIA DICTIONARY OF MODERN LITERARY
AND CULTURAL CRITICISM 122, 122 (Joseph Childers & Gary Hentzi eds.,
1995) (distinguishing history from genealogy on the ground that the latter
focuses more on "ruptures" and moments of "discontinuity" rather than a
continuing pattern of development).
10. See, e.g., Michael McCann, William Haltom & Anne Bloom, Java Jive:
Genealogy of a Juridical Icon, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 113 (2002).
11. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS
TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1987) (examining the legal strategies
involved in the Agent Orange cases and their effect on the development of the
mass toxic tort).
12. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange 1), 611 F. Supp.
1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
13. Id.
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the veterans forfeited their right to sue as individuals in exchange for
compensation from a private claims processing system administered
by the defendants. 14
Weinstein's move represents an important transition point in
class action law. Specifically, in subsequent years, many creative
lawyers and judges facing overcrowded courts followed Agent
Orange and used the class action device to funnel mass tort cases
into private claims processing systems.15 These developments, I will
argue, changed how we think about class actions in fundamental
ways that contributed to the current perception of a "crisis" in class
action law.
What follows is divided into four parts. Part I introduces the
notion of genealogy as a method. Part II provides a brief genealogy
of the class action "crisis" by describing the Agent Orange litigation,
and its progeny, in the context of class action law developments.
Part Il draws on this brief genealogy to argue that this branch of the
class action family tree has emphasized economics over access, with
problematic results. Instead of ensuring increased access to justice
for undercompensated victims, class actions are now viewed
primarily in terms of their ability to resolve large numbers of claims
quickly and cheaply. This shift, in turn, has fueled the current
"crisis" in class action law.
Finally, Part IV concludes that to reclaim the historic role of
class actions as a vehicle for justice, we must place more emphasis
on access and less on judicial economy and "global peace." This can
be achieved in a variety of ways, but especially by protecting the
rights of both future and present victims to have their day in court.
II. GENEALOGY AS METHOD
This Article proposes to conduct a partial genealogy of the
apparent "crisis" in class action law. Why genealogy? What does it
14. Id. at 1417.
15. See, e.g., In re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989) (Dalkon
Shield); Aheam v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
(asbestos), In re Copley Pharm. Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995)
(albuterol); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995)
(tobacco); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV 92-P-
10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *1 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (breast
implants); Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(asbestos).
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offer that a simple historical or doctrinal analysis does not?
Genealogy as a method was first practiced by Nietzsche, whose
Genealogy of Morals sought to understand the conditions under
which we construct our judgments about good and evil. 16 More
recently, Michel Foucault adopted many of Nietzsche's methods in
his explorations of madness, sexuality and punishment.' 7 Foucault
explained genealogy as a form of historical analysis that approaches
history with an emphasis on discontinuities and chance happenings
rather than an inevitable march (or linear succession) toward a
particular end or "origin."
' 18
One of the key advantages of genealogy as a method is that it
considers the complexity of the broad social and political context in
which ideas and concepts become more widely accepted.' 9 Put
differently, genealogy aims to expose certain aspects of history such
as particular social interactions or political agendas that have been
obscured or neglected. For example, a genealogical approach to the
history of reason, Foucault suggests, would reveal that it arose from
a variety of factors including personal conflicts among scholars and a
"spirit of competition., 20 In a similar way, a genealogy of the class
action "crisis" necessarily takes into account the broader social and
political context in which the reconfiguration of class actions is
taking place.
16. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY AND THE GENEALOGY
OF MORALS 151 (Francis Golffing trans., 1956).
17. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF
INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON, (Richard Howard trans., 1965); MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION
(Robert Hurley trans., 1978) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY];
MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (Alan
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977).
18. See generally Michel Foucault, Nietzsche, Genealogy, History, in THE
FOUCAULT READER 76, 76-100 (Paul Rabinow ed., Pantheon Books 1984)
[hereinafter Foucault, Genealogy].
19. As Wendy Brown explained, "genealogy permits an examination of our
condition that calls into question the very terms of its construction." WENDY
BROWN, POLITICS OUT OF HISTORY 95 (2001).
20. Foucault, Genealogy, supra note 18, at 78 (noting that "devotion to
truth and the precision of scientific methods arose from the passion of scholars,
their reciprocal hatred, their fanatical and unending discussions, and their spirit
of competition-the personal conflicts that slowly forged the weapons of
reason").
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Finally, genealogy is attentive to relationships of power and, in
particular, to the ways in which power is dispersed. For Foucault,
power is "not something that is acquired, seized, or shared," nor is it
embodied in particular institutions or structures. Instead, power is
best understood as something that is "exercised from innumerable
points" and deeply implicated with social relationships of all kinds.
22
It is precisely because of this that a genealogy, which pays close
attention to discontinuities in cultural understandings and
relationships, is helpful to understanding how we came to view class
actions as posing a "crisis" in the legal system. Put differently,
genealogy does not simply tell a story. Rather, it tries to get at the
story behind the story, in ways that a simple historical or doctrinal
analysis cannot.23
III. A BRIEF GENEALOGY OF THE CLASS ACTION CRISIS
"Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary."
24
The class action is a procedural device that permits the
aggregation of individual claims under certain conditions. Before it
made its way into the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it was an
"invention of equity" that responded to the concern that "mere
21. FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 17, at 93-94.
22. Id. at 94.
23. The class action crisis might also be analyzed in narrative terms. See
generally GERARD GENETTE, NARRATIVE DISCOURSE: AN ESSAY IN METHOD
(Jane E. Lewin trans., 1980) (explaining that the common use of the term
"narrative" connotes three different meanings and must be distinguished.
Genette proposes the use of different labels: "story" to describe the narrative
content; "narrative" to refer to the statement, discourse or narrative text itself,
and "narrating" for the narrative action and real or fictional situation in which
that action takes place. Genette argues that only analysis of the "narrative"
informs us of both the events that it recounts and the activity that supposedly
gave birth to it.). According to this type of analysis, we might view the class
action crisis as emerging from a number of counter-narratives at odds with the
original vision of the class action device as a tool for expanding access to
justice. Id. If that were the case, however, then it would be important to know
how and why certain narratives became dominant and others did not.
Narrative analysis is less useful for answering this question because it all but
removes the subject from the analysis. Genealogy, in contrast, allows us to
consider the actions of various subjects (albeit with limited subjectivities) such
as powerful lobbies which played a role in the reconfiguration of class action
narratives.
24. Foucault, Genealogy, supra note 18, at 76.
[Vol. 39:2
August 2006] GENEALOGY OF CLASS ACTION CRISIS 725
25numbers" would preclude the workings of justice. When the
Federal Rules were adopted in 1938, the availability of the class
action was extended to all actions.26 It was not until 1966, however,
when the federal class action rule was amended extensively, that
class actions became an important procedure that significantly
expanded access to justice for claims that might otherwise have gone
unheard.27
Among other things, the amendments allowed class actions to be
brought for injunctive and declaratory relief and for damages when
"questions of law or fact" predominated over individual
28considerations. The Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure described the changes as motivated by two concerns.
The first had to do with increasing judicial economy by reducing the
number of unnecessarily duplicative actions. 29 The second involved
a desire to "provide [a] means of vindicating the rights of groups of
people who individually would be without effective strength to bring
their opponents into court at all."3° In other words, the aim of the
Committee was to expand access to justice "even at the expense of
increasing litigation."
By the mid-1970s, class actions had become much more
commonplace. Some commentators began to herald the
development of "public law litigation, 32 in which class actions
played a prominent role in the enforcement of consumer and civil
rights-based claims. The vast majority of these cases relied almost
exclusively on the provisions of class action law that permitted class
25. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F.2d 182, 187 (8th Cir.
1948).
26. See Edward F. Sherman, American Class Actions: Significant Features
and Developing Alternatives in Foreign Legal Systems, 215 F.R.D. 130, 132
(2003).
27. See generally id. at 133-39 (noting that 1966 amendments "provide
means for vindicating the rights of people who individually lack effective
strength to bring their opponents into court").
28. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(2)-(3).
29. See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 497, 497 (1968-1969).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
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actions to be brought for injunctive and declaratory relief.33
Moreover, during these years it was widely assumed that the class
action device would be inappropriate for most cases involving
damage claims, such as personal injury litigation.
34
In the mid-1980s, however, all this began to change and by
2003, a very large percentage of class actions involved damage
claims.35 Even more surprising, many of these class actions involved
personal injury claims which had previously been considered
unsuitable for class action treatment. Some commentators have
argued that this change was a result of a variety of cultural and social
factors including developments in the mass media, lawyer
advertising, and changes in the structure of the plaintiffs bar.
37
There is a little doubt, however, that one of the key "ruptures ' 38 in
this historical timeline was the Agent Orange litigation.
A. The Agent Orange Story
Agent Orange is a powerful weed killer that was used by U.S.
troops during the Vietnam War to destroy crops and jungle which
provided cover for the Vietcong. Many varieties of weed killer were
used in Vietnam but Agent Orange was used the most.39 By 1971,
when it was no longer used, Agent Orange had been sprayed over as
much as one-tenth of South Vietnam and in parts of Cambodia.
40
Today, some thirty-five years later, the ground in Vietnam remains
contaminated with Agent Orange residue.41
As early as 1952, the manufacturers of Agent Orange and U.S.
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)-(3); id. at 1292.
34. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the
Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1343, 1344-53 (1995)(describing
the evolution of mass tort class action usage).
35. Sherman, supra note 26, at 134-35.
36. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 34.
37. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding
Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv.
961, 1013 (1993).
38. See MICHEL FOUCALT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 4 (A.M.
Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1972) (1969).
39. SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 17 (noting that Agent Orange amounted to
60% of all herbicides used in South Vietnam).
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army officials became aware that Agent Orange was contaminated
with dioxin, a toxic substance associated with chloracne (a severe but
treatable skin condition), respiratory irritation, cancer and other
adverse health effects.42 Since that time, the particular dioxin found
in Agent Orange has been described as "perhaps the most toxic
molecule ever synthesized by man."4 3 In fact, a disproportionately
large number of Vietnamese children born where spraying occurred
are born with mental and physical defects." A Japanese study found
that children were three times more likely to be born with cleft
palates or extra fingers and toes.45 These children are also highly
susceptible to cancer and disease.
46
To date, no successful litigation has been brought on behalf of
the Vietnamese and Cambodians.47 In 1984, however, in response to
litigation that was brought in state and federal courts across the
country, chemical companies paid $180 million into a fund for U.S.
veterans and some civilians.48 The settlement represented resolution
of the claims of some 2.4 million veterans and their families from the
U.S., Australia and New Zealand, and a relatively smaller number of
civilians. 49 As such, it is one of the largest mass torts to have faced
American courts (dwarfed only by the asbestos litigation), and the
settlement was the largest tort settlement in history at that time.
50
The Agent Orange litigation began as individual litigation based
on the health problems traceable to Agent Orange exposure brought
on behalf of a number of veterans and their families. One of these
cases was brought on behalf of the family of Paul Reutershan, who
had worked on a resupply helicopter in Vietnam and had flown
42. SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 17.
43. Id. at 18.
44. The Legacy ofAgent Orange, supra note 40.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. In 2005, a U.S. federal judge dismissed a case brought on behalf of the
Vietnamese because the use of Agent Orange at the time did not violate
international law. The case has been appealed. In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Agent Orange Legal Case
Dismissed, BBC NEWS, Mar. 10, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/
4336941.stm.
48. The Legacy ofAgent Orange, supra note 40.
49. SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 4-5.
50. Id. at 5.
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through clouds of Agent Orange during spraying.5 1  In 1978,
Reutershan died of cancer, which he and his family attributed to his
exposure to Agent Orange.52 Reutershan's family helped form a
nonprofit organization called Agent Orange Victims International
(AOVI).53 AOVI recruited an attorney named Victor Yannacone to
not only help litigate Reutershan's case, but also to expand the scope
of the litigation.
54
Yannacone agreed to try and convert the case into a class action
on behalf of all veterans who had been exposed to Agent Orange.
55
The hope was that, by doing so, AOVI would be able to bring much
more attention to the issue. The tactic worked. From the moment
the class action was filed, the media began to cover the case quite
closely.57 The lawsuit named Dow and Monsanto (manufacturers of
Agent Orange) and several other chemical manufacturers as
defendants. 58 In the original complaint, Yannacone defined the class
as "all those so unfortunate as to have been and now to be situated at
risk, not only during this generation but during generations to
come."
59
Although the U.S. government had clearly been involved in the
spraying of Agent Orange in Vietnam, it was not named as a
defendant for both legal and political reasons. The legal reason for
leaving the U.S. out of the case can be attributed to the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, which very likely protected the government
from liability for the veterans' injuries.60  The political reason
stemmed from the patriotism of AOVI members who were reluctant
to sue the government for which they had risked their lives.
61
After the class action was filed, the Judicial Multidistrict
51. Id. at 37.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 38.
54. Id. at 42-44.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 45.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the government usually
cannot be sued without its consent. Id. at 58. Further, under the Feres
doctrine, this immunity extends to all injuries which arise out of military
service. Feres v. U.S., 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).
61. SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 59-60.
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Litigation panel consolidated all Agent Orange cases across the
country and removed them to a federal court in Uniondale, New
York, where Yannacone was named lead counsel for the plaintiffs.62
The case posed enormous legal challenges. For instance, the
plaintiffs needed to prove that Agent Orange had actually caused the
injuries experienced by the veterans and their families. In addition,
exposure took place during wartime. Although the manufacturers of
Agent Orange were not directly immune from suit under the doctrine
of sovereign immunity, they argued they were not liable because
they had manufactured Agent Orange at the direction of the federal
government for its use during war.
A different sort of problem was posed by the fact that the class
action included cases brought on behalf of veterans who lived all
over the country. These cases were arguably subject to the laws of
the different states, in which the plaintiffs lived, thereby making any
attempt to actually try the Agent Orange class action an unwieldy
litigation nightmare.
Because the immunity of the manufacturers turned on several
factual questions, the district court delayed ruling on that issue.
63
Early in the case, however, the court solved the question of whether
the laws of all fifty states should apply to the class action by ruling
that federal common law applied to the case.64 Because this made
the case much easier to try, it was widely viewed as a major victory
for the plaintiffs. The Second Circuit, however, reversed this point,
declaring that federal common law could not be applied to the case.
65
Meanwhile, discovery proceeded, and the parties moved slowly
toward trial, even as other attorneys filed hundreds of cases on behalf
of Agent Orange victims across the country.66 As the number of
clients retained by these other attorneys grew, Yannacone's position
as lead counsel became more and more threatened as these attorneys
also demanded a greater role in the class action litigation.
67
62. Id. at 49.
63. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 796
(E.D.N.Y. 1980).
64. SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 57.
65. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange I), 635 F.2d
987, 995 (2d Cir. 1980).
66. See SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 71-73.
67. Id. at 108.
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Additionally, in October 1983, a few months before trial, Judge
George Pratt was removed from the case to take on new
responsibilities as a judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
68
A few days later, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, one of the most
outspoken and "unconventional" federal judges in the country, took
over the case.
69
In contrast to Judge Pratt, Judge Weinstein adopted an
aggressive "hands-on" posture toward the case.70  Although the
parties were clearly unprepared, he immediately set a trial date for
less than six months away.71 He also announced his strong interest
in seeing the case settle.72 To that end, Weinstein took the
extraordinary step of assigning three special masters whose primary
responsibility was to move settlement discussions forward.73
Weinstein also freely offered his own views on the strengths and
weaknesses of the case, and he named the United States government
as a defendant.74 Although Weinstein was ultimately unsuccessful
with this maneuver,75 it demonstrates how he influenced the
plaintiffs to name the government as a defendant even though they
were prepared to release it from the case.
Weinstein effectively maneuvered around the Second Circuit's
ruling that federal common law did not apply through procedural and
other technical arguments. He did so primarily by announcing a new
legal doctrine that he referred to as "national consensus law," which
76effectively merged the laws of the various states. Weinstein also
stymied the efforts of the United States to appeal his refusal to
dismiss them from the case.77 In his rulings on these and various
other legal issues, Weinstein showed little regard for precedent and a
strong interest in doing what was necessary to achieve an efficient
resolution of the parties' claims.
68. Id. at 110.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 111-13, 117-18.
71. Id. at 113.
72. Id. at 115.
73. Id. at 144-47.
74. Id. at 134-36.
75. Id. at 137.
76. Id. at 130.
77. Id. at 130-31.
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Weinstein also played an extremely active role in the settlement
negotiations by monitoring the parties' and special masters' activities
closely and by providing direction on both the substance and the
amount of the settlement. 78 This involvement was so intense that
Weinstein reportedly rejected a settlement amount the two parties
had agreed upon.7 9 He regarded it as excessive and directed the
special masters to discourage the parties from settling for that
amount.
80
Weinstein also reportedly issued subtle "threats" to the parties
about the consequences of their failure to settle. For example,
according to one of the plaintiffs' lawyers, Weinstein hinted strongly
that he had "carried" the plaintiffs' case for them up to that point, but
that he would no longer be such a strong advocate at trial if they
failed to settle.
8'
On the eve of trial, five years after the case was originally filed,
Weinstein achieved his goal and the parties settled the case. Under
the settlement terms, the defendant chemical manufacturers agreed to
pay the class $180 million as final settlement of all claims of
"anyone" who suffered injury "as a result of exposure to Agent
Orange in Vietnam.' ' 83 This included all claims that existed at the
time of the settlement, and all claims that would arise "in the
future. 84 Indeed, the settlement agreement expressly stated, "The
class includes persons who have not yet manifested injury.'
8 5
Under the terms of the settlement, individuals manifesting
symptoms before December 31, 1994, were entitled to a cash
78. Id. at 160-65.
79. Id. at 159-61.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 160.
82. Id. at 164-66.
83. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange II1), 818 F.2d
145, 169 (2d Cir. 1987). Although the settlement purported to resolve the
claims of "anyone" who suffered injury, it was never understood to include the
claims of Vietnamese and Cambodian citizens. See In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718, 729 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (certifying the class as
including only "those persons who were in the United States, New Zealand or
Australian Armed Forces" and their "spouses, parents, and children").
84. Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
85. Id. (citing In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Agent Orange IV),
597 F. Supp. 740, 865 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
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86payment. In exchange, veterans and their families who were
included in the class action could not bring separate suits apart from
the settlement.87 Moreover, the settlement terms dictated that the
court oversee administration and distribution of the $180 million
fund. 88 Judge Weinstein also retained jurisdiction over the claims of
all the individuals who had "opted out" of the litigation and elected
to proceed on their own.
89
In accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
require a judge to hold hearings evaluating the fairness of the
settlement, 9° Weinstein held eleven days of hearings across the
country in which class members testified. 91 As author Peter H.
Schuck noted, many of these witnesses
seemed to have a distinctive, almost religiously reverential
conception of the role of courts in American society. For
them, the Agent Orange case was a kind of elaborate
morality play staged by the judicial system, a highly
stylized contest between good and evil in which witnesses
would step forward to tell their tragic stories, and the judge
and jury, a modern Greek chorus, would certify the truth.92
Indeed, "many of the veterans testifying at the fairness hearings
became so engrossed in their own stories that they never got around
to discussing the [actual terms of the] settlement . . . ."93 When they
did get around to discussing the settlement terms, the overwhelming
majority were opposed. 94  Despite these reservations, Weinstein
granted final approval of the settlement in June of 1985, and the
Second Circuit affirmed his ruling a few years later.
95
86. Ryan, 781 F. Supp. at 910.
87. Agent Orange IV, 597 F. Supp. at 864.
88. Id.
89. See SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 182.
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
91. Agent Orange IV, 597 F. Supp. at 866.
92. SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 176.
93. Id. at 177.
94. Id. at 174-75 ("[N]early every witness, including those who supported
the settlement, agreed that the amount was very inadequate .... "[N]umerous
witnesses... [also] emphasized that they lacked sufficient information about
the settlement and about the claims of medical problems associated with Agent
Orange exposure to evaluate the fairness of the settlement.").
95. Agent Orange 1II, 818 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 1987).
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Approval of the settlement, however, was in many ways only a
beginning. This was largely because the preliminary settlement had
no specific provisions indicating how the fund would be
distributed. 96  Weinstein held further hearings because the court
retained jurisdiction for purposes of fund administration and
distribution.97 During these post-settlement hearings, he routinely
publicly disparaged the plaintiffs' causation case. 98 Weinstein also
"advantaged class action claims over otherwise identical opt-out
claims, apparently in the hope that this might encourage the latter to
return to the class." 99 In the end, Weinstein dismissed the claims of
every opt-out plaintiff who chose not to return to the class on the
grounds that they could not prove their injuries were caused by
exposure to Agent Orange.
1' °
In 1988, Weinstein announced the distribution plan. By that
point the fund had grown with interest to approximately $240
million.' 0' Of that amount, $13 million was for attorneys' fees, $5
million was reserved for veterans from Australia and New Zealand,
$10 million was set aside for the indemnification of claims brought
in state courts outside the class action, $170 million was allocated to
injured veterans and their family members, and $42 million was
placed into the "Agent Orange Class Assistance Program," which
distributed money to organizations providing services to children
born with birth defects and to veterans who were not otherwise
eligible for compensation. 10 2 Finally, under an important limitation
of the distribution plan, only individuals manifesting symptoms
before December 31, 1994 were entitled to a cash payment.l°3
Although Weinstein's settlement was widely praised as an
innovative solution to a challenging social problem, the settlement
was also heavily criticized on both public policy and legal
grounds. 1 4 From a public policy perspective, the harshest critics
were the veterans, many of whom felt the settlement had deprived
96. SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 172.
97. Id. at 173.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 183.
100. Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 902, 909 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 909-10.
103. Id. at 910.
104. See SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 175.
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them of their day in court. 10 5 Many of the legal critiques also stem
from this fundamental complaint.
10 6
Before Agent Orange, mass torts were not normally viewed as
suitable for class action treatment because the individualized nature
of the plaintiffs' injuries made it difficult for the class to share
sufficiently common interests. 10 7 In Agent Orange, Judge Weinstein
certified the case as a class action on the somewhat unusual grounds
that the class action device was, in his view, the "best vehicle to
achieve a fair result."' 1 8 More specifically, the court noted:
A single class-wide determination on the issue of causation
will focus the attention of Congress, the Executive branch
and the Veterans Administration on their responsibility, if
any, in this case. By contrast, possibly conflicting
determinations made over many years by different juries
make it less likely that appropriate authorities and the
parties will arrive at a fair allocation of the financial
burden, if any. 1
09
In other words, Weinstein's primary justification was not
legal-it was political. Specifically, Weinstein emphasized to
federal authorities the impact class certification might have and
urged them to pay closer attention to Agent Orange issues.110 He
also noted that class certification would lead to a more efficient
resolution of the case by "mak[ing] settlement more likely,"11' as the
defendants were probably unwilling to face a jury with so much on
the line. Weinstein cited a few legal reasons for certification, noting
issues of causation and certain defenses that were common to the
class,' 12 but these were secondary to the political and practical
rationales.
In sum, the usual legal protections afforded to class members
(the right of each individual to have his or her own day in court)
105. See id. at 176-77.
106. See id. at 176.
107. See id. at 7.
108. Agent Orange IV, 597 F. Supp. 740, 755 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
109. Id. (quoting In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 100 F.R.D. 718,
721 (E.D.N.Y. 1983)).
110. See id.
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were largely ignored by Weinstein in the Agent Orange litigation. 13
This in turn posed a number of problems when class members later
sought to remove themselves from the class settlement.
Many commentators have also expressed concern that
Weinstein's intense involvement in the settlement crossed lines of
judicial propriety. For instance, critics have argued that at the very
least, Weinstein should have recused himself from the fairness
hearings where he essentially ruled on the fairness of a settlement
that he played a heavy hand in crafting."14 As Schuck noted, the
settlement was "Weinstein's own creation in every sense of the
word."' 15 Because of this, Weinstein "should have left the Rule
23(e) [or fairness] evaluation of the settlement to another, more
detached judge."116 Weinstein's failure to do so "was a serious error
in judgment.""17
B. Agent Orange's Progeny
Judge Weinstein's approval of the class action settlement in
Agent Orange was a historic ruling. As John C. Coffee, Jr. noted,
"[w]ell into the 1980s, federal courts uniformly resisted attempts to
certify such mass tort class actions."'1 18 The Agent Orange litigation
marked a turning point in favor of certifying mass torts as class
actions. After Judge Weinstein certified and approved the class
settlement in Agent Orange, federal judges across the country began
certifying and approving class action settlements in several other
mass torts contexts.
For example, shortly after the Second Circuit affirmed Judge
Weinstein's approval of the Agent Orange settlement, the Fourth
Circuit approved a class action settlement of the tort claims of all
Dalkon Shield victims.119  Many other mass torts followed,'
20
113. See SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 176-77.
114. See id. at 178-79.
115. Id. at 178.
116. Id. at 179.
117. Id.
118. Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1344.
119. In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989).
120. E.g., Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505 (E.D. Tex. 1995)
(asbestos); In re Copley Pharm. Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456 (D. Wyo. 1995)
(albuterol); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 160 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. La. 1995)
(tobacco); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV-92-P-
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including two unsuccessful attempts to settle asbestos claims on a
global scale. 121  Because these two cases received tremendous
attention in the plaintiffs bar and resulted in important Supreme
Court rulings, they are worthy of some discussion.
The first case, Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor 22 , attempted
to settle the claims of both present and future victims with an opt-out
class action that allowed those plaintiffs who did not wish to be part
of the class to exclude themselves.123 As in Agent Orange, many
class members had no way of knowing they were members of the
class since they had yet to experience an asbestos-related injury.'
24
Although the lower court approved the settlement in Amchem, the
U.S. Supreme Court overturned both the class certification and the
settlement in the case.'
25
Despite the lower court's approval of the settlement, both
academics and many lawyers in the plaintiff's bar harshly criticized
Amchem. Many of these criticisms focused on the enormous
attorneys' fees in the case and the potential for collusion between
and among plaintiff and defense counsel. 126 Many plaintiffs' lawyers
were also dismayed by the fact that "global peace" in the asbestos
context meant the end of their practices as they knew it. Perhaps
because of this, attorneys with a substantial asbestos practice who
were not a party to the class settlement heavily invested in objecting
to the settlement.
2 7
The Supreme Court's reversal of Amchem did not address the
ethical concerns raised by the settlement, nor did it address the
economic impact of the litigation on the plaintiffs bar. Instead, the
Court's reasoning relied primarily on the requirements of Federal
10000-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521 (N.D. Ala. 1994) (breast implants);
Georgine v. Amchem Prods. Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (asbestos).
121. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods.
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
122. 521 U.S. at 606.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 628.
125. Id. at 597.
126. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1376; Susan P. Koniak, Feasting
While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products Inc., 80 CORNELL L.
REv. 1045 (1995).
127. Among other things, these attorneys hired Professor Laurence Tribe,
perhaps the nation's foremost Supreme Court litigator, to argue their case to
the Supreme Court. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 596.
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Rule 23, although it did recognize that constitutional considerations
might also be at stake. 128 According to Federal Rule 23(a)(4), the
class representative must "fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class."' 29  The drafters of the modern class action rule
regarded this requirement as an important safeguard for the due
process rights of class members.' 30 In Amchem, the Court overturned
the settlement based on its conclusion that intra-class conflicts
between present and future victims rendered the named plaintiffs
incapable of representing the class.131
Although the Court's holding in Amchem turned on its
conclusions about the inadequacy of representation, the Court also
discussed the "highly problematic" impediments to adequate
notice. 132  Moreover, Amchem echoed the observations of lower
courts that many future victims in the class may not know of their
asbestos exposure or realize the extent of harm that might occur.
133
The Court also "recognize[d] the gravity of the question whether
class action notice sufficient under the Constitution and Rule 23
could ever be given to legions so unselfconscious and
amorphous."' 
34
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.135 was the second asbestos-related
class action settlement overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court.
136
Like Amchem, it also attempted to resolve the claims of both present
and future asbestos victims. 37 Unlike Amchem and Agent Orange,
however, the parties in Ortiz sought class certification settlement
approval under the no opt-out rules. 138 In other words, Ortiz was a
128. See id. at 625-28.
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).
130. See 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1765 (3d ed. 2005); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (noting "the Due Process Clause... requires that the
named plaintiff at all times adequately represent the interests of the absent
class members").
131. See 521 U.S. at 625-27.
132. See id. at 628; see also Schweitzer v. Consol. Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936,
944 (3rd Cir. 1985) (noting that adequacy of notice to potential future asbestos-
injury claimants would, at the least, raise "thorny constitutional issues").
133. 521 U.S. at 628.
134. Id.
135. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 825-26.
138. Id. at 825.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
mandatory class action, and class members could not elect to remove
themselves from litigation and pursue their claims individually.1
39
The one exception involved claimants who filed their claims prior to
August 27, 1993, the date the settlement was filed with the Court.'
40
For these individuals, the class was not mandatory, and they were
permitted to proceed with litigation on their own. 
141
In an ordinary class action suit involving damages, mandatory
class certification is impermissible as class members must be
afforded a full and unfettered right to exclude themselves from the
class. 142 The justification for proceeding as a mandatory class in
Ortiz stemmed from the financial problems of defendant Fibreboard
Corporation. Fibreboard faced asbestos claims well in excess of its
assets and was engaged in a lengthy coverage dispute with its
insurers. 14 3 The settling parties reasoned that because all present and
future asbestos victims with claims against Fibreboard faced a risk
that it would soon be insolvent there were no intra-class conflicts. 44
Moreover, it was appropriate to make the class mandatory and
prohibit individual claimants from proceeding on their own since
individual claims might significantly reduce the amount of assets
available for other claimants.1
4 5
The settlement reached in Ortiz essentially involved the creation
of a private claims processing system.146 Under the settlement terms,
Fibreboard and its insurers contributed $1.535 billion to a settlement
fund from which class members could seek compensation. 47 Under
the system, class members would receive offers to settle their claims
based in large part on the severity of their injuries. 148  If class
members did not accept the amount offered, they could go through
mediation and, after that, arbitration. 149  If still unsatisfied, they
139. Id. at 825-26 & 826 n.5.
140. Id. at 826 n.5.
141. See id.
142. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985).
143. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 821-22.
144. See id. at 839-40.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 824-25, 827.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 827.
149. Id.
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could file a tort suit subject to an overall limitation of $500,000 in
compensatory damages, although punitive damages were not
recoverable.150
Significantly, present and future victims were treated identically
under the Ortiz settlement, a fact which the settling parties hoped
would obviate concerns about adequacy of representation.'
15
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court again rejected the settlement on
adequacy of representation grounds, primarily because the present
and future victims had not been divided into separate subclasses with
separate representation. 152 In the Court's words:
[I]t is obvious.., that a class divided between holders of
present and future claims (some of the latter involving no
physical injury...) requires division into homogenous
subclasses under Rule 23 (c)(4)(B), with separate repre-
sentation to eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.
153
Like Amchem, the settlement in Ortiz would likely have wiped
out significant segments of asbestos litigation practice in the
plaintiffs bar. 154 Consequently, the plaintiff's bar invested heavily
in objecting to the settlement. 155  Academic criticism of the
settlement was less vocal, perhaps because on its terms the Ortiz
settlement seemed significantly fairer than the Amchem settlement,
and there were also fewer indications of possible collusion.
156
Notably, both Amchem and Ortiz employed a novel class action
technique-the so-called class action "for settlement purposes
only."' 157 This was one of the key changes in class action law that
emerged from the application of class actions to personal injury law.
It essentially involves filing and settling a class action complaint
simultaneously, with no threat of trial. 158 One of the issues raised by
150. Id.
151. Id. at 856-57 n.31.
152. Id. at 856-59.
153. Id. at 856.
154. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 601 (1997).
155. See STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE,
ASBESTOS LITIGATION 84-85 (2005), http:/www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/
2005/RANDMG162.pdf.
156. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1401 (noting that the Ortiz settlement
"did not involve the same glaring disparities as in Georgine").
157. See, e.g., Note, Back to the Drawing Board: The Settlement Class
Action and the Limits of Rule 23, 109 HARV. L. REV. 828, 829 (1996).
158. Id.
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Amchem was whether class certification decisions were subject to the
same level of scrutiny even if they were the product of a
settlement. 159 Amchem held that they were.16
0
Like Agent Orange, Amchem, and Ortiz, other settlement class
actions tend to be lawyer and/or judge driven. For example, in both
Amchem and Ortiz, defense counsel approached plaintiff's counsel
and asked them to reach a class-wide settlement that would provide
the defendants with "global peace."' 161 In Ortiz, the settlement
negotiations featured the heavy involvement of federal Judge Robert
Parker of the Eastern District of Texas, who has made something of a
career in crafting creative resolutions for large numbers of asbestos
claims.' 62  There is little doubt that Judge Weinstein's intense
involvement in the Agent Orange settlement served as a model for
Judge Parker.
In contrast to Amchem and Ortiz, many of the recent class
actions targeted for criticism were filed in state courts and feature
significantly less cooperation from defense counsel. For example, a
report by the industry-funded American Tort Reform Association
complains about nine state courts they describe as "unfair" to
defendants on class action issues.163 Most of the examples rely on an
increase in state court class action filings as evidence of
unfairness. 
164
In contrast, class action filings in federal court seem to pose less
concern for defendants, particularly when defense counsel essentially
invited the litigation as a mechanism for obtaining "global peace" of
159. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620.
160. Id.
161. See Koniak, supra note 126, for a full discussion of the conditions
under which the settlement of Amchem took place.
162. See generally Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1385-86 (discussing Judge
Parker's innovations in the broader context of mass torts); see also Myriam
Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modem Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REv. 373, 383-384 (2005) (noting that
Judges Parker and Weinstein were motivated by similar values, concerns and"moral intuitions" in applying class actions to mass torts).
163. See, e.g., AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004
(2004), http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004/hellholes2O04.pdf; see also
John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, Class Action Magnet Courts: The
Allure Intensifies, in 5 CIV. JUST. REP. (Manhattan Inst. for Policy Research,
New York, N.Y., 2002), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/
cjr_05.pdf (focusing largely on Madison County, Il.).
164. See AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., supra note 163.
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a mass tort. 165 In fact, the practice became so common and so
attractive to the defense bar that one prominent scholar, Francis E.
McGovern, wrote about the new trend in "defensive" class actions.
1 66
According to McGovern, class actions were attractive to the defense
bar because they were "successful in obtaining finality,
predictability, and a cessation of financial and public relations
bleeding.
' 167
From the perspective of many observers, however, the Supreme
Court's rulings in Amchem and Ortiz put the settlement class action
practice of purchasing "global peace" out of business, at least in
federal court. 168  Perhaps as a result, class actions became less
attractive to defendants as a means of obtaining "global peace." This
became especially true after the latest round of the Agent Orange
litigation described below.
C. Agent Orange: The Next Generation
Although the Agent Orange settlement purported to provide the
defendants with "final peace," individual litigants who appeared to
be members of the class attempted to sue the defendants
independently. The first challenge came from two groups of
veterans who developed injuries several years after the settlement
approval. 169 These veterans claimed that since they did not even
know they had been injured at the time of the settlement, they should
not be bound by the settlement of a lawsuit which purported to
include them.' 70 The trial court dismissed the veterans' claims on the
grounds that the doctrine of res judicata barred the action. 171 The
Second Circuit affirmed, holding that the veterans were included in
the class settlement even though they were unaware of any injury at
the time of certification.
172
165. Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in
Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ. L. REv. 595, 602 (1997).
166. See id.
167. Id. at 595.
168. See Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57
STAN. L. REv. 1475, 1475-76 (2005).
169. See Ryan v. Dow Chem Co., 781 F. Supp. 902 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
170. Id. at 918-19.
171. Id. at 919.
172. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1433-34 (2d
Cir. 1993).
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In recent years, a more successful challenge was brought by two
veterans, Joe Isaacson and Daniel Stephenson. 173 In 1996 and 1998,
these men developed cancers that experts linked to Agent Orange.
174
Both Stephenson and Isaacson claimed they were not aware of the
Agent Orange class action or its settlement. 75 Moreover, they were
not eligible for compensation under the class action settlement
because their cancers did not develop until after the December 31,
1994 claims submission deadline. 176  Thus, the Agent Orange
settlement effectively barred their claims and provided them with
essentially no compensation. 1
77
Perceiving this as a grave injustice, Stephenson and Isaacson's
attorneys filed what is known among the class action bar as a
"collateral attack" on the settlement. 178  In essence, a "collateral
attack" is a belated challenge to the fairness of the settlement that
seeks to overturn the settlement in whole or in part.179 In Stephenson
and Isaacson's cases, their attorneys argued that the class action did
not bar their clients' claims because their clients, and all other class
members who developed Agent Orange-related injuries after 1994,
received inadequate representation in the class action. 180 They also
argued that their clients could not be bound by the settlement
because the notice of the class action and the opportunity to opt out
was inadequate for individuals who, at the time, had no reason to
believe that they were in the class.
18 1
Both cases were transferred to Judge Weinstein's court, and he
dismissed the cases as barred by the settlement.182 On appeal,
173. See Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 2001).
174. Id. at 255.
175. Id. at 260.
176. Id. at 260-61.
177. See id.
178. See generally Kevin R. Bernier, The Inadequacy of the Broad
Collateral Attack: Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Company and Its Effect on
Class Action Settlements, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1023 (2004) (analyzing the Second
Circuit's use of a collateral attack standard in Stephenson); Gregory M. Wirt,
Missed Opportunity: Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co. and the Finality of
Class Action Settlements, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 1297 (2005) (arguing that
Stephenson improperly disregarded the principle of finality).
179. See Wirt, supra note 178, at 1299-1300.
180. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 257-61.
181. Id. at 259-61.
182. See id. at 251.
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however, the Second Circuit reversed Weinstein and, to the shock
and surprise of many in the class action bar, agreed with Stephenson
and Isaacson that the settlement did not preclude them from pursuing
their individual litigation because they were "inadequately
represented" in the class litigation. 183 Key to the court's reasoning
was the fact that neither plaintiff was eligible for compensation under
the original settlement because their cancers had developed after the
1994 claim submission deadline.
184
The Second Circuit relied upon Amchem and Ortiz to allow
Isaacson and Stephenson to continue with their cases outside the
Agent Orange settlement. 185 Like the purported class in each of the
asbestos cases, Agent Orange included both present and future
victims.1 86 As a practical matter, this meant that like the asbestos
settlement, the settlement in Agent Orange suffered from two fatal
flaws. One was the difficulty in providing adequate notice to future
victims., 87 The second was the difficulty in ensuring that members
of a class, which included future victims, were adequately
represented by class representatives whose injuries were already
manifest.
188
The Second Circuit focused on both of these concerns when it
took a second look at the Agent Orange litigation on behalf of
Isaacson and Stephenson. 189 In their arguments before the court,
Isaacson and Stephenson's attorneys pointed out that the class
representatives had yet to be identified when Judge Weinstein
certified the Agent Orange class action. 190 They also noted that both
the original class definition and the notice of settlement appeared to
limit the litigation to only those veterans who had already
experienced some sort of Agent Orange related injury.1
91
183. Id. at 261.
184. Id. at 260-61.
185. Id. at 259-61.
186. See Samantha Y. Warshauer, Note, When Futures Fight Back: For
Long-Latency Injury Claimants in Mass Tort Class Actions, Are Asymptomatic
Subclasses the Cure to the Disease?, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1219, 1230 (2004).
187. See id. at 1257-58.
188. See id. at 1237-38.
189. Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 255-61.
190. Id. at 260.
191. Id. The original class definition identified the class as "persons who
claim injury from exposure to Agent Orange." In re "Agent Orange" Prod.
Liab. Litig., 506 F. Supp. 762, 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1980). Similarly, the notice of
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The Second Circuit was primarily concerned, however, with the
fact that the prior litigation purported to bind Isaacson and
Stephenson to a settlement from which they obtained no
compensation. 192  It determined that such a settlement could not
possibly have provided adequate representation of their interests.'
93
As a result, the Agent Orange settlement, at least with respect to
Isaacson and Stephenson, was fatally flawed. 194 The defendants
appealed the Second Circuit's ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court to no
avail. 195 The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit in a 4-4
decision, with no opinion.
196
These cases, along with several others, proceeded individually in
Judge Weinstein's court. 197 Shortly after the cases were remanded to
Weinstein, however, he dismissed them on the grounds of the
government contractor defense.198 Weinstein noted that he would
likely dismiss the individual cases on causation grounds should the
Second Circuit reverse on the government contractor defense. 1
99
IV. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CLASS ACTION DEVICE
"The successes of history belong to those who are capable of
seizing [the] rules, to replace those who had used them, to disguise
themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and redirect
them against those who had initially imposed them .... ,200
Like other legal "crises" that have recently been diagnosed, the
class action "crisis" may have more to do with perception than
the class settlement advised of "WHAT YOU MUST DO NOW IF YOU
BELIEVE YOU HAVE A CLAIM FOR ADVERSE HEALTH EFFECTS."
Brief for Respondents at 6, Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111
(2003).
192. See Stephenson, 273 F.3d at 260-61.
193. Id. at 261.
194. Id.
195. See Dow Chem. Co. v. Stephenson, 539 U.S. 111 (2003).
196. See id. Justice Stevens, whose son served in Vietnam and died of
cancer at a relatively young age, recused himself from the litigation. See
Warshauer, supra note 186, at 1252 n.181.
197. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 404
(E.D.N.Y. 2004); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 344 F. Supp. 2d 873
(E.D.N.Y. 2004).
198. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 304 F. Supp. 2d 404; In re
"Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 344 F. Supp. 2d 873.
199. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 344 F. Supp. 2d at 875.
200. Foucault, Genealogy, supra note 18, at 86.
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reality.2° 1  For example, a report by consumer watchdog Public
Citizen suggests that many of the complaints about the problems
with class actions have little empirical support.202  Perception,
however, is no small matter because a widely held perception that
something is wrong can lead to significant changes in public policy,
even when the perception is demonstrably at odds with empirical
reality.
20 3
The remarkable thing about the current perception of a "crisis"
in class action is that, in earlier days, the class action device was
viewed as an important tool for social justice---one that was
especially important to the civil rights and consumer movements.
204
Today, however, the class action has eroded to something that
focuses on judicial economy and capping defendants' liability rather
than justice for under-represented groups. 
2 0 5
Under the historic leadership of Judge Weinstein, the Agent
Orange litigation resulted in a global settlement resolving the claims
of both present and future victims for injuries resulting from their
exposure to Agent Orange in Vietnam.206  Many have praised
Weinstein's role in the settlement as a creative, if somewhat
controversial, solution to an intractable legal problem that threatened
201. See, e.g., WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE
LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004).
202. See PUB. CITIZEN CONG. WATCH, CLASS ACTION "JUDICIAL
HELLHOLES": EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IS LACKING (2005),
http://www.citizen.org/documents/OutlierReport.pdf.
203. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55
MD. L. REV. 1093 (1996) (discussing the impact of empirically unfounded
anecdotes about the tort system on the tort reform policy agenda).
204. See Abram Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982) (discussing the role of the class action device in
consumer and civil rights litigation); McGovern, supra note 165, at 595 (noting
the historic use of class actions to resolve consumer and employment disputes).
205. See generally Koniak, supra note 126 (describing how the class action
device was employed to limit class members' rights in the asbestos context);
McGovern, supra note 165 (describing the strategic use of class actions to cap
defendants' liability); Brian Wolfman & Alan B. Morrison, Representing the
Unrepresented in Class Actions Seeking Monetary Relief, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
439 (1996) (noting problems with class action settlements providing adequate
protection for class members' fights).
206. See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein,
Creator of Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010,
2013-14 (1997).
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to tie up his court and those of other judges.20 7 In many ways,
however, Weinstein's historical maneuver also paved the way for
today's "crisis" in class action law.20 8
Even from this very genealogy, it is clear that Judge Weinstein
viewed the class action device as an important tool for increasing
judicial economy.209 He also perceived the ability of the defendants
to obtain "global peace" through a class action settlement as an
important bargaining chip that could bring otherwise recalcitrant
defendants to the settlement table. 210  Perhaps more importantly,
Judge Weinstein understood that the threat of a class action trial
potentially offered justice to Agent Orange victims whose injuries
might otherwise go unrecognized. 21'
In other words, in the Agent Orange litigation, the somewhat
unique ability of the class action device to provide judicial access to
large numbers of injured people was an important motivating force
for the litigation and the settlement that followed.212  This is
important because it suggests the extent to which Judge Weinstein
employed the class action device in Agent Orange in much the same
way that others had employed the device in the civil rights context,
i.e., to obtain results that could not be achieved through individual
litigation alone.213 In the cases following Agent Orange, however,
we see the advent of class action litigation "for settlement purposes
only," allowing both courts and defendants to resolve large personal
injury cases without the actual risk of a potentially unwieldy and
otherwise unmanageable class action trial.214
What is perhaps most remarkable about these cases is that many
of them were brought at the defendants' behest.2 15 In particular,
207. See, e.g., id.; David Luban, Heroic Judging in an Antiheroic Age, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 2064 (1997).
208. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 277-97 (noting that
Weinstein's "'procedural' law reform" in the context of the Agent Orange
litigation ran the risk of "sacrific[ing] the promise of substantive justice").
209. See Minow, supra note 206, at 2014.
210. See id. at 2017-19.
211. See id. at 2016.
212. See id. at 2017-18.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 2020.
215. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1350 (describing how defendants
have "begun to solicit plaintiffs' attorneys to bring ] class actions"); Koniak,
supra note 126, at 1056 (describing the history of a class action asbestos
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federal class action filings posed little concern to defendants during
this time." 6 This was largely because defense counsel essentially
invited the litigation as a mechanism for obtaining "global peace" of
a mass tort.2 17 From the perspective of many observers, however, the
Supreme Court's rulings in Amchem and Ortiz put the class action
settlement practice of purchasing "global peace" out of business in
federal court.2 18  Perhaps, as a result, class actions became less
attractive to defendants as a means of obtaining "global peace." This
became especially true after the latest round of Agent Orange
litigation.
In short, the Agent Orange litigation brought about two key
shifts in the way we think about class actions. The first shift
involved a greater focus on the utility of the class action device as a
vehicle for increasing judicial economy.220  This shift is perhaps
easiest to see in the many attempts to resolve the asbestos crisis
through creative uses of the class action device, but it was also
apparent in Agent Orange itself.22 1 The second shift has been to
place greater emphasis on the economic need of class action
defendants to obtain "global peace" through class settlements that
capped their liability.
222
Although recent Supreme Court rulings may have limited a
defendant's ability to obtain "global peace," especially with respect
to future victims, this shift in thinking continues to significantly
settlement in which the author claims that the defendants "paid class counsel
on the side" to obtain class action resolution of the claims); McGovern, supra
note 165 (describing settlement class actions instigated by defendants);
Wolfman & Morrison, supra note 205, at 448 (describing how asbestos
defendants "approached two prominent members of the plaintiffs' asbestos bar
in an attempt to negotiate a [class action] settlement of all future asbestos
claims" long before the case was filed).
216. See McGovern, supra note 165.
217. See Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at 1350 (describing how defendants have
"begun to solicit plaintiffs' attorneys to bring [] class actions" as a "means of
resolving their mass tort liabilities"); Koniak, supra note 126, at 1051
(describing defendants' efforts to initiate a settlement class action in the
asbestos context as a way out of the asbestos "mess").
218. See Cabraser, supra note 168, at 1475-76.
219. See Bemier, supra note 178, at 1044-45; Wirt, supra note 178, at 1310.
220. See Minow, supra note 206, at 2014.
221. See id. at 2017.
222. See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 165, at 606.
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affect our view of class actions and our approach to mass torts. 223 In
mature mass torts such as asbestos, there is a sense that defendants
224have paid enough. Further, in newer torts, such as litigation
arising out of the 9/11 attacks, there has been a concern with
preventing bankruptcy. 225  Perhaps, more importantly, we see
continuing attempts by defendants and others to obtain "global
peace" through ongoing experimentation with class actions and new
innovations that seek to obtain a similar result, such as collective
waiver arbitration clauses and legislation to cap liability in asbestos
and other torts (e.g., the 9/11 compensation fund).226
All of these changes brought shifts in power relations among
and between the clients, lawyers and the courts.227 Who gained?
Who lost? What were the effects of those shifts in power? At first
glance, the settlement in Agent Orange seemed to offer a win-win
situation all the way around: the veterans, whose claims Judge
Weinstein perceived to be weak, received some compensation for
their alleged injuries; the defendants obtained "global peace";
counsel for both parties received more than adequate compensation;
and Judge Weinstein cleared his court of a very large number of
cases.
228
223. See, e.g., Wirt, supra note 178, at 1313 (arguing that, despite the recent
Supreme Court rulings, "[t]he Court should seek to... protect the finality of
existing settlements").
224. See, e.g., Mark D. Plevin et al., Don't Bankrupt Asbestos: It's Sad that
Bankruptcy Offers the Only Rational Method of Resolving Litigants' Claims,
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 19, 2001 (arguing, among other things, that repeated
punitive damages awards in asbestos cases have gone "far beyond any
justifiable amount").
225. KENNETH R. FEINBERG, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF
2001, at 3 (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/final-report.pdf ("[T]he purpose was
to provide financial assistance to an airline industry potentially threatened with
collapse as a result of the terrorist attacks and thereby to protect the American
economy against the consequences of that collapse").
226. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000) (creating the September 1 1th
Victim Compensation Fund); Gilles, supra note 162, at 396-400 (describing
the "birth" of the collective action waiver); Mark K. Moller, Let a Hundred
Cases Bloom, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 21, 2005, at 62 (arguing for opt-in class
actions).
227. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 31-37 for an overview of some of
the politics surrounding class actions in recent years.
228. See supra notes 209-215, and accompanying text.
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The veterans, however, were not happy with the settlement, even
from the start. At fairness hearings held around the country, the vast
majority opposed it.229  More recently, veterans groups have
continued to voice their opposition to the settlement in briefs filed in
the Second Circuit's hearings on "collateral attack" litigation.
230
Despite the opposition, Judge Weinstein and class counsel approved
the settlement, apparently convinced that they knew best.
231
What Judge Weinstein and the lawyers may have missed is that,
for the veterans, resolution of the Agent Orange issue may not
simply have been a matter of obtaining an appropriate amount of
economic compensation. Instead, like many plaintiffs, it is likely the
veterans wanted to tell their stories and have them heard by a court
of law.232 The fairness hearings provided some opportunity for this,
but the veterans ultimately did not have their day in court. Indeed,
they are still struggling to obtain it.
233
What about the plaintiffs' lawyers? Given the costs and risks of
trial, particularly in the Agent Orange litigation, which raised thorny
causation issues, there is little doubt that the global settlement served
their immediate, individual interests. It is equally clear that class
action settlements in other mass torts allow plaintiffs' lawyers to
eliminate risks while walking away with often astronomically large
fees.
234
229. See SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 173-78 for an account of the fairness
hearings.
230. See Brief for Veterans and Military Service Organizations as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, In re "Agent Orange" Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 05-1820 (2d Cir. Oct. 12, 2005).
231. Judge Weinstein preliminarily approved the settlement agreement on
January 7, 1985; reaffirmed that decision on June 18, 1985; and issued a final
order of dismissal on July 9, 1985. See Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 618 F. Supp.
623, 624-25 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); Agent Orange IV, 597 F. Supp. 740, 857-58
(E.D.N.Y. 1984).
232. Other reasons for suing that have little to do with compensation include
a desire to prevent similar harm in the future, the need for an explanation, and
a desire to hold someone accountable. See generally Charles Vincent et al.,
Why Do People Sue Doctors? A Study of Patients and Relatives Taking Legal
Action, 343 LANCET 1609 (1994) (discussing reasons motivating patient
lawsuits).
233. See Brief for Veterans and Military Service Organizations as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 228.
234. See Wolfram, supra note 4, at 1231.
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Plaintiffs' lawyers may benefit in other ways as well. Unlike
individual litigation, there is no class-wide retainer agreement in
class action litigation and, as a result, the client has relatively little
control over fees.2 35 Instead, the judge (or defense counsel, through
236settlement) sets the fees for class counsel. Under these
circumstances, the potential for collusion is not insignificant. 237 As
the Rand Institute noted in its study of class actions, the "central
fear" is that class counsel "unregulated in any real way by clients"
will agree to settlements that offer little value to their clients and
large fees for themselves.
238
Why would defendants and the court agree to such a deal? To
obtain "global peace," of course. 239 In an adversarial system, the
defendants are under no obligation to ensure that the class obtains a
fair deal. If defendants can obtain "global peace" by paying
plaintiffs' lawyers enough money to disregard their clients' interests,
there is little incentive for them not to do so. In the "long run," the
Rand Institute warned, such practices will "bring the legal system
into disrepute. ' '24  Indeed, one of the key complaints in our present
"'crisis" is that class counsel is being enriched with little benefit to
the classes they purport to represent.
241
With the rise of the tort reform movement, plaintiffs' lawyers
are under increasing public attack.242 In the class action context,
these attacks have been exacerbated by conflict within the plaintiff's
bar.24 3 As we saw in Amchem and Ortiz, class-wide resolution of
personal injury claims drew heated opposition from those members
of the plaintiffs bar who represented individual asbestos clients and
who had little to gain from a global resolution of asbestos claims.
244
In this respect, the effects of Agent Orange and its progeny on the
235. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 77.
236. Id. at 77-78.
237. See id. at 79.
238. Id.
239. See id. at 108-10.
240. Id. at 79.
241. See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 126, at 1109.
242. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the
Worst of Times: The Precarious Nature of Plaintiffs' Practice in Texas, 80
TEx. L. REv. 1781, 1781 (2002).
243. See id. at 1783-95.
244. See, e.g., McGovern, supra note 165, at 596.
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plaintiff's bar both echo and contribute to what has been going on in
the plaintiff s bar more generally.
For instance, as a result of the tort reform movement, it has
become more difficult for personal injury lawyers to win their
lawsuits. 245 Moreover, in some instances, legislative changes have
made it more difficult for these lawyers to bring new litigation.
246
Because of these developments, personal injury lawyers have
adopted an "entrepreneurial" spirit to survive.247 For some, this has
meant becoming more creative in finding new clients and new areas
for litigation.248 For others, it has resulted in organizational changes
of their practice.249
Class action attorneys are among the "entrepreneurial" attorneys
in the plaintiffs bar who are struggling to adapt to the new
conditions. They are "entrepreneurial" in the sense that they are
willing to sit down with defense counsel and craft inventive global
250settlements resolving large numbers of personal injury claims.
While this line of work is lucrative, the professional and social
capital costs cannot be overlooked as these attorneys are under attack
from both fellow plaintiffs' lawyers and the general public.251 Still,
the choice for many may come down to business from class action
settlements or potential loss of business due to global resolution of
claims.
Thus, Agent Orange and its progeny have threatened the
plaintiffs bar in important ways. Even though some plaintiffs'
lawyers became more empowered through their involvement in class
252actions, others saw their practices threatened. In response, these
threatened attorneys criticized their fellow plaintiffs' lawyers.253
These criticisms, in turn, fueled the critiques of the plaintiffs bar
254that have characterized the tort reform debate. As a practical
matter, this meant that the application of class actions to personal
245. See, e.g., Daniels & Martin, supra note 242, at 1799-1800.
246. See, e.g., id. at 1798.
247. See id. at 1782.
248. See id.
249. Id.
250. See id. at 1796.
251. See id. at 1781.
252. See id. at 1781-82.
253. See McGovern, supra note 165, at 604.
254. See id. at 604-05.
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injury cases, even when brought at the defendant's request in an
attempt to obtain "global peace," introduced a whole new set of
problems for plaintiffs' lawyers who were already on the defense in
public discourse.
255
From this perspective, defendants would appear to be the
winners in the turn toward class action settlement of personal injury
claims. In particular, by bringing class actions "for settlement
purposes only," defendants obtained "global peace" with relatively
low risk and disreputed the plaintiff's bar.2 56 As a result, defendants
might be accused of having "seiz[ed] [the] rules" on class actions
and "pervert[ing] them" to their own purposes. 257 But, again, the
picture is not so simple.
For one thing, the Supreme Court's rulings in Amchem, Ortiz,
and Stephenson suggest that it may no longer be possible for
defendants to buy "global peace" through class action settlements,
especially in federal courts.258 Meanwhile, applying the class action
device to personal injury litigation has opened Pandora's Box.
Plaintiffs' lawyers are filing class actions in personal injury and other
types of cases in record numbers, especially in state courts. 259 These
cases are extremely problematic for defendants, largely because of
concerns that state court judges are more willing to let the cases go to
trial.
260
Under these circumstances, defendants feel that they must settle
the cases, even when there are serious questions about the merits of
the litigation, because they are unwilling to risk potentially huge jury
verdicts.2 6 1 Thus, from the defense perspective, Agent Orange and
its progeny may be viewed as more trouble than it was worth.
The picture is even less happy for defense counsel. Although a
handful of defense counsel have developed expertise in resolving
class actions, as with the plaintiff's bar, "global settlements" threaten
to put large numbers of defense attorneys out of work. One wonders,
for example, what will happen to the insurance defense bar if
255. It also introduced a troubling new narrative into public discourse about
class actions. NC - there should be a "See e.g.," here
256. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
257. Foucault, Genealogy, supra note 18, at 86.
258. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 66.
259. See id.
260. See, e.g., Center for Individual Freedom, supra note 4.
261. See HENSLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 75.
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Congress were to pass legislation funding an independent
compensation system for asbestos victims. This is not to say that
defense counsel do not support their clients in obtaining a "global
settlement" of asbestos litigation. Rather, the defense bar is likely
aware of the effects that such a settlement will have on the economic
well being of their firms. The same would also be true for "global
settlements" of other mature torts on which small industries of legal
practice have become more or less dependent.
What about the courts? From a judicial economy perspective,
they seem to be the clear winners. Many judges may also enjoy the
increased status associated with being a leader in resolving mass
262torts. Certainly, Agent Orange seemed to increase Judge
Weinstein's professional capital in important ways.263 To the extent
that these settlements draw criticism, however, the courts may be
viewed as complicit in degrading the civil justice system. As I argue
below, this leads to less legitimacy for the political system in the
long run.
In the end, Agent Orange and its progenj look and feel lawyer
and judge-driven rather than client-driven. 64 This has proved
problematic. Specifically, the shift in the way we approach class
actions plays up the economic advantages of using the class action to
resolve mass torts. Consequently, the original rationale for class
actions (to provide improved court access for previously
uncompensated victims) is left behind.265
In sum, the roots of a perceived "crisis" in class action law lie in
Judge Weinstein's inventive, but ultimately problematic, attempt to
use the class action device to resolve personal injury litigation.
266
Although well intended, the move led to important changes in the
relative power of plaintiffs, defendants, their lawyers and the courts
267in resolving mass torts. Ultimately, these changes led to both the
relative disempowerment of victims and a perception that class
actions have more to do with making money for lawyers than
providing access to justice for individuals who might otherwise go
262. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 206.
263. See id.
264. See, e.g., supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
265. See Carter, supra note 2, at 1123-25.
266. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 207.
267. See id.
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unrepresented.268
For all of these reasons, Judge Weinstein's employment of the
class action device to resolve large numbers of personal injury claims
established the foundation for what became an especially important
branch in the class action family tree. Although well intentioned, the
fruit of that litigation is now proving to be problematic.269
V. CONCLUSION
In a 2000 report on the state of class actions, the Rand Institute
asked what seemed to be a fundamental question about the future of
class actions:
[Is the class action device] primarily an administrative
efficiency mechanism, a means for courts and parties to
manage a large number of similar legal claims, without
requiring each litigant to come forward and have his or her
claim considered individually? Or is it primarily a means
of enabling litigation that could not be brought on an
individual basis, in pursuit of larger social goals, such as
enforcing government regulations and deterring unsafe or
unfair business practices?
270
The report then argued that the debate between efficiency and
enabling goals was a false one because, in their view, an increase in
efficiency would necessarily lead to an increase in access. 271 The
recent history of class actions, however, suggests that this is clearly
not so. 272 Instead, it is apparent that the employment of class actions
in mass tort litigation has led to some serious problems regarding
access to justice, particularly for future victims. In other words,
there is a conflict between approaching the class action device as a
mechanism for increasing the economic efficiency of litigation, and
its utility as a mechanism for expanding judicial access to those who
might otherwise go unrepresented.
What is the solution? The answer was provided in part by the
268. See id. at 2078.
269. See, e.g., id. at 2080.
270. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 49.
271. See id.
272. See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 34; Wolfman & Morrison, supra note
205.
273. See, e.g., Koniak, supra note 126.
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Supreme Court in Amchem and Ortiz. In both cases, the Court called
for a return to a more careful reading of class actions rules, with
greater attention to how settlements affect the rights of class
members, especially "future" victims. 274  The answer was also
provided in the Second Circuit's decision in the second generation of
Agent Orange litigation, when veterans who had been injured
without receiving compensation from the earlier settlement were
allowed to have their day in court.275
These rulings recognize and keep alive what is perhaps our most
fundamental legal maxim-that each individual is entitled to his or
her own day in court,2 7 6  Class actions are an exception to this
principle, but an exception of limited scope and application. Perhaps
the clearest limitation on class actions is found in the constitutionally
based right to opt out of class actions "wholly or predominantly for
money judgments.,,277  Several more limitations are embodied in
Federal Rule 23, which governs the formation and resolution of class
278action litigation. By continuing to adhere strictly to these
limitations on class actions, courts ensure that the focus on class
actions remains on expanding access to justice, rather than economic
efficiency.
In Agent Orange, Amchem and Ortiz, lawyers and judges
favored efficiency over preserving access to future victims. 279 In
Judge Weinstein's mind, this was the best way to achieve what he
felt was a just result.280 The lawyers and judges involved in crafting
the Amchem and Ortiz settlements undoubtedly felt the same way.
As Justice Ginsburg noted in Amchem, however, courts are not
especially well suited for the cost-benefit balancing that is involved
274. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Amchem Prods. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
275. See supra notes 183-185 and accompanying text.
276. See, e.g., id.
277. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811 n.3 (1985); see also
Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that a court may mandate a right to opt out of a certified class).
278. See, e.g., FED R. Civ. P. 23; Cabraser, supra note 168, at 1499-1506.
279. See, e.g., SCHUCK, supra note 11, at 127; Coffee, Jr., supra note 34, at
1431 ("Georgine [v. Amchem] and Agent Orange suggest that federal courts
will resist any effort at curtailing the justiciability of future claims in mass tort
class actions when to do so threatens their ability to control their dockets.");
Koniak, supra note 126.
280. See Agent Orange IV, 597 F. Supp. 740, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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when economic efficiency enters the mix as a legal principle.28 1 In
traditional tort litigation involving individual litigants, cost-benefit
balancing is typically done by the jury. On the other hand, Ginsburg
suggested that in the case of mass torts, the answers should perhaps
come from the legislature.282
The continuing legitimacy of the political system itself is at
stake. As in other liberal democracies, courts in the United States
play an important role in bolstering the legitimacy of liberal,
democratic regimes. 283 This legitimacy is largely maintained by
284
committing to open and equal access to the courts. Because of
this, many argue that open and equal access to the courts is essential
for Americans to believe that the United States legal system achieves
social justice.
2 85
All this suggests that a greater attention to judicial access, as
opposed to economics, might serve the legal system well in
addressing the perception of a "crisis" in class action law. While
economic efficiency and "global peace" are surely admirable goals,
they should not be the guiding principle of courts in the class action
context. Instead, economic considerations should only be considered
to the extent that they directly impinge on preserving access to
justice. When judges and lawyers place more emphasis on
economics than justice, legal rulings begin to lose their legitimacy
and critiques of the legal system follow.
In the context of mass torts, this does not mean that class action
treatment is never appropriate for personal injuries involving future
victims. Under some circumstances involving future victims, the
tension between preserving judicial access for individual litigants
and economic efficiency in mass tort cases may be particularly
complex. In these cases, the legal interest in preserving the future
victims' right to individualized hearings may be directly at odds with
extremely compelling economic considerations, including the very
real possibility that the defendant's assets will be exhausted by the
281. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997).
282. See id.
283. See David M. Trubek et al., Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies
of the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the Creation of Transnational
Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 407, 460 (1994).
284. See id.; TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS,
STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT (1987).
285. See Trubek et al., supra note 283, at 459-60.
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claims of early litigants. Under these circumstances, preserving the
future victim's right to his or her own day in court becomes, as a
practical matter, little more than a hollow gesture.
Because of the importance of ensuring meaningful judicial
access, we should be extremely cautious and skeptical about class
action settlements that promise greater judicial access at the price of
compromising a future victim's rights. Certainly, Agent Orange did
not provide us with a sufficiently compelling set of circumstances to
justify this trade-off, as it left some victims without any
compensation at all.2 86
In sum, to reclaim the historic role of class actions as a vehicle
for justice, we must place more emphasis on access and less on
"global peace." By doing so, we will go a long way toward defusing
the perceived "crisis" in class actions and, perhaps, restore the class
action to its original and best use--expanding judicial access for
litigants who would otherwise find it too expensive to pursue their
claims.
286. See supra notes 189-191 and accompanying text.
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